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Sociologists and social psychologists often approach honor as a cultural trait belonging to 
specific countries and communities. An honor culture is defined as a society in which social 
status is defined by willingness of individuals to use force to defend one’s reputation (Black, 
2011; Cooney, 2014). Studies in the past have compared countries in order to establish which 
cultures can be considered as belonging to an honor culture (Vandello & Cohen, 2003); yet, they 
ignored the intra-cultural variability within countries. The purpose of this study was to 
systematically analyze Brazil, an honor culture, for intra-cultural variability in honor attitudes 
and values. To do so, we used data from the Latin American Public Opinion Survey and 
aggregate individual responses regarding honor concerns into regional data to create an Honor 
Index for the municipalities represented in the survey. Next, we compared the average responses 
of each municipality to demographic data and material conditions, such as the average education, 
violence, urbanization and trust in law enforcement of each municipality, thus analyzing 






 According to Julian Pitt-Rivers, honor is “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also 
in the eyes of his society” as well as “his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is 
also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride” 
(Pitt-Rivers, 1966). In other words, honor is one’s reputation in the eyes of others, it is a measure 
of social worth. Honor culture has been regarded by some as a cultural adaptation to material 
conditions (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Others, however, have sought to understand the concept of 
honor with the help of the concepts of cultural capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 2011). 
Scholars have compared honor culture to cultural capital due to the similarities in the process of 
acquiring a reputable image before their peers, which grants them a certain influence and 
respectability (Grzyb, 2016). However, these studies have failed to elaborate on how Bourdieu 
can explain the fragility of this cultural capital and how it must be constantly defended.  
Previous studies have also shown that honor culture is the characteristics of an entire 
nation; rather, different honor cultures are present in certain locations, contingent on certain 
conditions, which Nisbett and Cohen (1996) and others (e.g., Henry, 2009) demonstrates to vary 
across the U.S. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) found that people living in southern and some western 
parts of the U.S. exhibited concerns that could be classified as being honor concerns. In that 
sense, Henry (2009), found that honor emerged as compensation for low social class, and it was 
more prominent precisely in southern parts of the country. Therefore, the conclusions these 
studies reached is that the United States is a heterogeneous, multicultural nation, and thus it 
cannot be referred to as having a national, homogenous culture.  
Serving as an  inspiration for studying honor culture in Brazil, it seemed that this very 
same approach could also be applied to Brazil, and allow for similar conclusions. This is so is 
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mostly because we suggest that the historical formation of both the U.S. and Brazil is actually 
quite similar. Both had a vastly heterogenic immigration pattern throughout their history, with 
people coming from various cultures in Europe and some in Asia. Another type of “immigration” 
that happened in both countries was the process that brought several thousand people from 
Africa to work as slaves in the American continent. After settling, these immigrants made both 
countries become large multicultural nations. 
 But their similarities are not only historical. In the socioeconomic level, both countries 
have massive problems with regard to poverty and inequality. Both countries stand out in the 
Gini Index ranking, according to data from the World Bank (2013). The U.S. is considered the 
most unequal country in the Western, developed world, while Brazil ranks at 16th in the world 
overall in terms of inequality. Both countries also have had diverse economic activities across 
their territory. For instance, both countries have had regions in which farming cultures were 
more prominent, and other regions in which herding was more prominent. This is important to 
the study of honor because research suggested that people in herding cultures tend to have higher 
honor concerns than in farming cultures due to the fact that herding is a type of economic 
activity in which one’s property is more subject to being violated than farming (Figueiredo et al., 
2004; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).    
 All this variability is accentuated by the large geographical dimensions of both countries, 
with the U.S. being the 3rd largest country in the world and Brazil is the 5th. All these differences 
and inequalities being spread out in immense territories make both countries have great variance 
in their cultures. Therefore, if the U.S., which is not an honor culture, can have regions in which 
honor concerns are high amongst the population, could it not be that Brazil, an honor culture, 
could have locations in which honor concerns were low?  
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In Brazil, the existence of several frontier-type regions could explain why honor culture 
exists there. However, most of the research on honor culture in Brazil focuses on specific 
regions, mostly the North and Northeastern Brazil (Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015), and 
not on any broad comparison between regions. However, historical studies have shown that 
Southern Brazil has had communities that valued honor as a measure of social worth (Vendrame, 
2013). What are, then, the conditions for honor culture in Brazil, and where is it mostly 
prevalent?  
The importance of the current research is, therefore, to close two main gaps in previous 
research regarding honor culture in Brazil. Firstly, there is the question of studies about honor 
culture treating Brazil as a homogenous culture, when in reality it is quite multicultural 
(Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Secondly, we seek to challenge the notion present in novels, movies, 
studies and popular culture, that Brazilian honor is concentrated in the North and Northeast of 
Brazil. To do so, we suggested a systematic approach to measure honor across Brazilian 
municipalities using survey data and cross it with demographic and socioeconomic data, in order 
to assess the origins and condition for honor culture in Brazil. The first step to do so is to 
understand what honor culture is and in what conditions it emerges. 
Honor 
What is most important about honor is that it depends on individuals meeting cultural 
standards. By doing so, individuals become honorable and earn respect. In societies that value it, 
honor is often linked to status; how people behave and how others see them is a measure of their 
worth.  
Individuals can only possess honor or be honorable through the recognition of others. 
This means that individuals think about themselves in relation to how they believe others see 
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them. In other words, one’s sense of self is interdependent. Honor is, therefore, not something 
that one is born with, but something that one earns. Since the concept of honor is interdependent, 
it is much more easily lost than gained. It is precisely because of this that in honor societies, 
honor can (and must) be defended, even by silencing those who challenge one’s honor. This may 
entail the defense of one’s honor and reputation with violent means. The central problem with 
honor cultures is, therefore, an environment in which folk live constantly under threat of having 
their reputation and therefore their safety challenged. Violence seems to be the most appropriate 
and quick response to an insult in order to establish that one is a force to be reckoned with if 
provoked. This study seeks to investigate what role violence plays in social interactions within 
cultures and societies which emphasize honor as a high measure of social worth. We seek to 
understand how honor affects interpersonal relationships, status, and the manner in which those 
types of societies functions. 
Honor Cultures 
Research has shown that there are societies in which honor plays a central role (Guerra, 
Gouveia, Araújo, Andrade, & Gaudêncio, 2013), and individuals belonging to these types of 
cultures are known for holding values and attitudes that are permeated by the concept of honor 
(Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Thus, the 
code of conduct in honor cultures is based on reputation and social image of the self in the eye of 
others; it is the measure of the worth of the individual vis-à-vis the society in which he/she lives 
(Guerra, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012). Miller (1993) claims that honor cultures can only 
exist in a context of reciprocity, since in honor cultures “there was no self-respect independent of 
the respect of others” as well as “not just a matter of the individual; it necessarily involved a 
group” (Miller, 1993). Thus, it is not hard to see why one feature of honor societies is that they 
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are mainly, although not exclusively, collectivistic. Collectivistic cultures tend to value the 
interdependence of the self and in doing so, hold values that are only possible in reference to 
others (Black, 2011; Cooney, 2014; Guerra et al., 2013; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). In 
addition, both collectivistic and honor cultures are extremely family oriented, meaning that 
attitudes that affect the reputation of an individual reflect on all the other individuals belonging 
to the same family, thus affecting the reputation of the family as a whole (Guerra et al., 2013). 
Societies which possess an honor culture include non-Asian collectivistic communities, 
specifically those with a Muslim, African and Latin background (Uskul, Oyserman, & Schwarz, 
2010). Also, research has identified that there are honor attitudes and values in certain sub-
cultures of the United States, mainly the Southern and Western part of the country (Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996). 
 Much like any type of culture, the system of honor culture determines to a certain extent 
the customs and beliefs of a community. Miller (1993) claims that honor manifests itself in these 
cultures as “more than just a set of rules for governing behavior. Honor permeated every aspect 
of consciousness: how you thought about yourself and others, how you held your body, the 
expectations you could reasonably have and demands you could make on others” (Miller, 1993). 
With that in mind, it is possible to understand why an honor culture entails a type of agency from 
individuals raised in it which “require a violent response or risk of loss of social standing” 
(Cooney, 2014). Researchers suggest that since honor is much more easily lost than gained, 
people whose honor is challenged must respond quickly and violently to establish themselves as 
someone to “be reckoned with” and regain their honor (Stevens, 1973). In that sense, people who 
belong to these types of cultures often engage in violent conducts that are guided by honor 
beliefs; namely, corporal punishment for supposedly inappropriate behavior of family members, 
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strong reactions towards offenses, and, in more extreme cases, honor killings (Cooney, 2014; 
Santos, 2012; Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015; Mosquera, Manstead, & 
Fischer, 2002). 
Honor cultures also tend to have strict gender expectations, meaning that the dominant 
values and beliefs are gender specific. For men, the main value is the appearance of strength and 
capacity to respond strongly (even violently) to offenses by an outside party whereas for women, 
it lies on “the need to maintain sexual chastity and social restraint” (Guerra et al., 2013). These 
attitudes towards female sexuality are especially found in Latino cultures, and are often referred 
to “Marianismo”, which literally means that women are expected to emulate virgin Mary, both in 
regards to their sexual chastity and their compassion and forgiveness (Stevens, 1973).  
Since these cultures tend to be male dominated or patriarchal oriented societies, the 
expectation of conduct from women in honor cultures helps understanding how honor in these 
types of societies is much easier to lose than to gain. Unlike men, women are born with “honor” 
(sexual chastity), which they cannot earn. However, they can lose it, and losing it makes it 
difficult to gain it back. Individuals in honor cultures are much more likely to motivate their 
actions based on these values than in non-honor cultures.  
Some theorists have largely explained honor culture with male domination ideology 
originating from patriarchal societies (Gill, 2006). Societies in which cultural beliefs of men’s 
superiority are prevalent tend to create material conditions that render women powerless relative 
to men (Gill, 2006; Hansen, 2002). To understand how and why these values and attitudes 
emerge, it is important to analyze the similarities between these cultures in order to assess their 
origins, as well as the conditions in which they originate. 
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Material Conditions of Honor 
Arguably, culture is at least in part a material form of adaptation, a collective response to 
specific conditions. Indeed, some researchers consider honor culture a system of social 
regulation that is a collective solution to a problem (Dória, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Souza, 
2015). An important approach is provided by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), who argued that 
communities had to possess a series of material traits for an honor cultures to arise. The authors 
argued that these types of cultures had to have two main traits, namely, a scarcity of economic 
resources, and the absence of efficient law enforcement. Crucially, the authors argued that in 
honor cultures the benefit of resolving conflict outside the boundaries of the law (illegally) 
outweighed the costs (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Nisbett and Cohen (1996) proposed that in a 
violent environment with few economic resources and absent law enforcement people are 
potentially vulnerable to transgression of others, who might steal their property or who might 
physically harm them. They argued that this was typical of frontier-like environments with little 
or no presence of the state, and was typical of herding societies, which had a type of economic 
activity that was more susceptible to danger (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). 
In these cultures, any confrontation with others to protect one’s family or property might 
turn violent. Even when individuals prevail in a physical altercation, they might sustain harm 
which weakens them for any subsequent altercation. To offset this, it is more efficient to find a 
way in which open violence can be minimized or even avoided. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) 
argued that establishing a violent reputation served such a purpose. Of course, establishing such 
a reputation can be costly, and bears risk. However, once an actor has established in the eyes of 
others, that they are strong and will act violently against any possible aggression, they minimize 
the risk of actually having to get involved in a fight.  
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Nisbett and Cohen (1996) suggested that this dynamic serves as the basis for honor 
cultures. Individuals find means, violent or not, to signal to others that they follow a certain code, 
which allows them to anticipate a violent response if the individual is challenged. However, the 
effectiveness of this deterrence is based on their ability to establish and preserve their reputation 
in the eyes of others. Typically, this entails establishing oneself as “honorable.” If they are 
unable to do so, individuals could be at the mercy of transgressors. A similar dynamic can also 
be observed in prisons and inner cities, in which respect and reputation play a central role in 
interpersonal interactions (Anderson, 2000).  
Anderson describes how young people living in poverty and violent areas develop 
behavioral tools to survive a dangerous and threatening environment. In that sense, establishing a 
reputation has a very similar predicament in both inner cities and honor cultures. The difference, 
however, lies in what Anderson called the “dilemma of the decent kid”, which entails the 
challenge of individuals being reputable before their peers, while simultaneously behaving as 
“decent” kids before their families (Anderson, 2000). In honor cultures, however, a man’s honor 
lies not only in how he behaves, but how his family behaves. Men in honor cultures are not 
necessarily bound by these contradictions because having a reputation is not contradictory to 
being “decent”. In an honor culture, a person’s social worth is measured equally in the household 
and in the streets, and a child acting out is a challenge to the patriarch’s honor more than an 
affirmation of the child’s honor.  
Both these perspectives can relate to Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital, that is, a set of 
symbolic assets that can determine one’s social status (Bourdieu, 2011). When applying this 
notion to honor, it is possible to see that people, and especially men, living in societies that carry 
elements of violence and threat, as well as a general disbelief in state authorities, need to acquire 
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a specific form of symbolic capital in order to build a reputation. This reputation not only 
ascribes them social status, but it is also a tool that can shield them from external violence.  
The kind of predominant economic activity of a society can also be a predictor for honor 
culture. Research shows that communities that originate from herding cultures, often in frontier-
type areas, are more oriented toward honor more than communities that originate from farming 
cultures (Henry, 2009; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In a frontier area in which a person needs to take 
care of animals in a semi-nomadic life, it is quite possible to find oneself in a situation in which 
one’s main source of livelihood can be stolen or killed. However, farmers are settlers whose 
property is typically stationary; such populations tend to establish communities, in which 
neighbors cooperate, and which social rules are enforced. 
Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argued that early European immigration to the southern United 
States occurred primarily from the British Isles, and from areas that were traditional herding 
societies. Because these mostly Scots-Irish immigrants continued to be herders, they not only 
brought the seeds of an honor culture with them, but material conditions, such as the 
vulnerability of assault by others, and by doing so they promoted this cultural pattern. In the 
absence of an active and present law-enforcement in the early Americas, the solution was the 
development of the promise of a violent response, that is, the deterrence of transgression against 
one’s person, one’s family and one’s property. Therefore, in the U.S. South reputation, strength, 
and symbolic proxies of being “reputable”, “honorable” solved a very concrete problem. If 
people respected and feared one another, they might not attempt to hurt each other. It is possible 
to observe this cultural pattern in cowboy culture in the Wild West, as described by Courtwright 
(1996). These descriptions once more appear to shows parallels with Bourdieu’s notion of 
cultural capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 2011). The appearance of strength and 
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reputability are similar to Bourdieu’s description of symbolic power (2011), meaning that even 
though a person may not actively subdue or physically influence another person, the symbolism 
behind their status is an indication of their competence and guarantees them power. 
Research shows that regional variation in honor culture across the U.S. depends on the 
history of immigration, and the presence of herding cultures (Henry, 2009; Nisbett & Cohen, 
1996). Research suggests that there are much higher levels of violence in the Southern U.S. than 
the Northern U.S., and this is so even when controlling for known predictors of violence such as 
poverty, race, population density and percentage of males between 15 and 29 years of age 
(Nisbett, 1993). Nisbett (1993) demonstrated that the South had much higher rates of argument 
related murders than the North, in cities with less than 200,000 people. This type of violence was 
also much higher than felony related murders in Southern States. This hints at the main cause of 
violence in small cities in the South of the U.S.: arguments between acquaintances.  
When Nisbett (1993) controlled for the aforementioned predictors of violence, violence 
was still significantly higher in Southern U.S. states when compared to Northern states. 
Additionally, there are higher levels of gun ownership in the Southern states which could be an 
indicator of distrust in law enforcement as a means for protection (Felson & Pare, 2010). People 
in the Southern U.S. also believe much more strongly than their Northern peers that a person has 
the right to kill a person who threatens his or her family or property, as well as a much stronger 
belief in owning guns for self-protection (Felson & Pare, 2010; Nisbett, 1993). It is possible to 
observe how and why honor cultures could arise under these conditions; a higher rate of violence 
put together with distrust of law enforcement can lead to the development of an honor ideology 




Having established the material conditions under which honor as a culture arises, it is 
important to examine ideology of honor, which is reflected in specific ideas about gender 
relations, self-defense, family, righteous behavior, virtues, strength, courage and the socialization 
of children. Firstly, honor societies are inherently patriarchal, which that gendered ideas about 
honor necessarily entail male domination. Moreover, it entails that the family is an extension of 
the patriarch, which in turn make the family a patriarch’s property and a reflection of himself 
(Hasan, 2002). 
Honor is interdependent, and one’s own honor is conferred to others, but so is one’s 
dishonor. In a family, a man might be undermined by the dishonorable behavior of his family 
members, and men are judged whether they can be “the master of their own house.” Arguably, 
this is central to why female honor is based on sexual modesty and chastity. Women, whether 
they are wives or daughters, are seen as both “owned” by and a reflection of a man, thus 
becoming, in essence, evidence of his honor as well as a threat to it. This also occurs with male 
children, but in this case, it is expected that a man’s son is strong and courageous, and a sign of 
weakness or femininity could also undermine the patriarch’s power (Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; 
Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). Children are seen as reflections of their parents; if a man’s 
child is weak or promiscuous – the former a risk with male children, and the latter with female 
children -  it means that the man (i.e., their father) failed to put them in line, to raise them 
properly, thus becoming evidence of his worthlessness. This often legitimizes domestic violence 
because it is effectively a means for a man to “get the wife and kids in line” and ultimately 
defend his honor in the community. The same logic applies when an outside party threatens a 
man’s honor or when one of his family members does something that compromises his 
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honorability in the eyes of others; it must be met with violence in order to reestablish the lost 
honor. In sum, what an individual does and what their family does is critically important in these 
types of societies, and members of an honor society tend to hold social views that support male 
domination and strength, virtues and the righteousness of behaviors related to defending one’s 
honor.  
This type of ideology has been documented in attitudinal differences between honor and 
non-honor cultures (Guerra et al., 2012). It has been often argued that cultures of Iberian origins 
tend to be honor-type cultures, most of which are mostly located in Latin America (Johnson & 
Lipsett-Rivera, 1998; Uskul et al., 2010; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Not only do survey 
responses from people living in these societies reflect concerns about honor, most of these 
countries fit the criteria for material conditions in which honor cultures are more likely to arise. 
These include frontier type situations, and economic activities, such as herding, extraction of 
wood and mining, in which violent disputes are more likely to occur. Also, these countries are 
mostly considered to be developing countries, as well as having high levels of violent crime and 
highly inefficient legal systems, filling the criteria for the material conditions expressed by 
Nisbett and Cohen (1996). 
Brazil is a good example of this. Much like its Latin American neighbors, the main 
reason of Brazilian colonization at first was the extraction of gold, a typical frontier type 
economic activity which entailed high risks of aggression, from native indigenous communities 
as well as rival explorers (Furtado, 2007). The geography of Brazil, which was for the most part 
a dangerous and dense forest, as well as the type of predominant economic activities, provided 
quite the terrain for the development of an honor culture - like the Southern United States in the 
17th and 18th century. During the same period, and even until the early 20th century, Brazil was a 
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country which was yet to be explored. Strong law enforcement simply did not exist. Brazil, 
however, is a very large country with a lot of cultural and economic diversity. It has had 
immigrants from numerous places around the globe, and has had very diversified types of 
economic activities such as mining, herding and wood extracting as well such as farming 
(Furtado, 2007). The first three are typical predecessors of honor cultures; however, farming is 
not. Therefore, it is important to analyze how this diversity affects the argument of Brazil as an 
honor culture in its entirety. 
Brazil as an Honor Culture 
Brazil is considered an honor culture, much like its Latin American neighbors. Studies 
show that Brazilians in fact hold cultural values and attitudes regarding honor concerns, which 
they historically inherited from Portugal (Guerra, et al., 2012; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998; 
Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Also, Brazilian society has received much immigration from honor 
societies, mainly Portugal, Italy, Japan and several parts of Africa (Seyferth, 2011). Brazil is also 
notorious for honor killings, domestic violence and assaults motivated by honor beliefs (Santos, 
2012; Souza et al., 2015). Studies have shown that males involved in this type of conduct often 
justify it by claiming they could not be seen as cowards or “frouxos” (Portuguese word for 
“wimp”) before their peers (Souza, 2015). Comparative research has shown that Brazilians, in 
average, tend to show more honor attitudes than countries which are not considered honor 
cultures. For instance, Vandello and Cohen (2003) looked at perceptions of honor in the U.S. and 
in Brazil, and discovered that Brazilians tend to see men whose wife had been unfaithful as less 
trustworthy than Americans. The same effect was observed when referring to domestic violence; 
Brazilians saw men who engaged in domestic violence as more trustworthy and masculine than 
Americans did (Vandello & Cohen, 2003). This result is to be expected if one assumes that in an 
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honor culture, such as Brazil, a wife’s conduct is seen as reflection of the husband’s ability and 
willingness to control her. 
Studies often use countries as the unit of analysis when dealing with honor cultures 
(Mosquera et al., 2002; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). If one generalizes a country as being a 
homogenous culture, there is the risk of ignoring the cultural heterogeneity within a single 
country. For instance, research within the U.S. has repeatedly shown there are regional cultures, 
such as the Southern and Western United States, which represent an honor based culture, 
whereas this is not the case for the Northern and Eastern U.S. (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). This 
study raises the possibility that giving a country the honor-type stamp without analyzing intra-
cultural differences risks leaving a large chunk of the variance unanalyzed. Therefore, the reason 
for this study is to investigate if there are any differences in honor culture within various 
Brazilian territories, and if so, what could possible explain them. 
Brazil has a great variety of populations that migrated and formed the country’s cultural 
identity. It is plausible to assume that there are profound differences between its regions, 
depending on which groups settled where. In Brazil, Portuguese and Africans were the main 
immigrants between the 16th and 18th century (although the latter were obviously not voluntary 
immigrants). After that, there was a massive European immigration in Brazil in several parts of 
the country, such as Germans and Italian in the mid-late 19th century to the South and Southeast, 
as well as Japanese, Spanish, Syrians and Lebanese during the 20th century to São Paulo, and a 
brief Dutch occupation in the Northeast during the 17th century (Groesen, 2014; Ribeiro, 1997; 
Seyferth, 2011). All these different cultures had great influence in the formation and 
development of Brazil, and the fact that they established and grew in different regions accounts 
for a great deal of the heterogeneity of that culture. 
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Darcy Ribeiro (1997) suggests that Brazilian culture is divided into five sub-cultures, 
each located in separate regions of the country. The “crioula” sub-culture, composed of African 
slaves and Portuguese colonizers, mainly present in the northeast; the “cabocla” characterized by 
native (i.e., indigenous) Brazilians and African slaves in the North; the “caipira”, concentrated in 
the Southeast region of Brazil, especially Sao Paulo, characterized by Portuguese and Italian 
immigration, dedicated to producing coffee and industry; the “gaúcha” located in the south of 
Brazil, descending from German and Portuguese immigrants and focused on herding; and the 
“sertaneja”, located in the inlands of the Northeast and Central parts of Brazil characterized both 
by large rural areas and large cities.  
Research has shown that these sub-cultures in Brazil actually show great levels of 
variability with regard to values and moral attitudes. According to Dessen and Torres (2002), the 
sub-cultures identified by Ribeiro (1997) can be characterized by specific group norms that 
influence the making of culture in those places. The “cabocla” and “crioula” sub-cultures are 
“characterized by an authoritarian and patriarchal social system emphasizing group norms and 
group loyalty” (Dessen & Torres, 2002). The “gaúcha” and “caipira” subcultures tend to be 
composed by “individuals who do not sanction establishment of social norms that perpetuate 
inequality, but recognize and accept the existence of it” (Dessen & Torres, 2002). Moreover, the 
“sertaneja” sub-culture would be a sort of “mix” between the last four, much because of the 
multiple environments of large cities and rural areas. By looking at Dessen and Torres’ 
argument, we can clearly see that their description of the “crioula” cultures of the Northeast is 
very close to how other literature describes honor culture.  
In Brazil, these features are often ascribed by academics and even in popular culture to 
the people in the Northeast (Santos, 2012; Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). 
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It is possible that this is so because the Northeast of Brazil is often associated with a regime 
known as “Coronelismo”, literally meaning “Colonelism”, a regime of Colonels. This regime 
was a power structure, which existed in some regions of Brazil between 1889 and 1930, although 
some features of this political and power structure remained as far as the 1960’s. Its basic feature 
is the hypertrophy of private power and state power, having as methods electoral frauds and 
disorganization of public services in favor of private interests (Leal, 2012). On the top of these 
power structures were people that were known as Colonels, even though they did not possess the 
actual military title. Although they exerted most of their influence through violence, the power of 
these “Colonels” resided greatly in their reputation, much like the honor system this paper aim to 
discuss (Leal, 2012).  
Other studies found Italian immigrant communities in southern Brazil to embrace values 
systems that required, among other things, disputes about challenges against family honor to be 
resolved violently (Vendrame, 2013). Furthermore, women’s sexuality was also treated as a 
matter of honor. When a pregnancy out of wedlock occurred, for instance, the situation was 
resolved by forcing a marriage under violent threats (Vendrame, 2013). Similarly, rape was 
typically denied, even when a member of one’s family was the victim, in order to avoid 
tarnishing the family honor. This occurred because a rape victim was considered to be “damaged 
goods”, and secondly that it made the patriarch appear weak for not being able to protect his 
family (Vendrame, 2013). 
Brazil is also a country with high levels of social and regional inequities. According to 
the World Bank, Brazil’s Gini Index is currently at 52.9, the 16th highest in the world (The 
World Bank, 2013). Much of this inequality exists because of stark regional differences. In terms 
of violence, the state of Sao Paulo (Southeast) had a homicide rate of 13.4 per 100,000 
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inhabitants, whereas the state of Alagoas (Northeast) had a rate of 63 per 100.000 homicides 
(IPEA, 2016). Assuming that the material conditions of honor cultures are present in some parts 
of Brazil, but not in others, it is plausible to assume that there is dramatic regional variation with 
regard to honor culture in Brazil. 
 There is a gap in research regarding intra-cultural variances within honor cultures and 
Brazil is no exception. To be sure, Brazilian literature, popular culture and, to some degree, 
academic research does reference the fact that the Northeastern states are states which possess a 
strong presence of the culture of honor (Santos, 2012; Souza et al., 2015). Those regions are 
generally rural, arid, poor and historically lacking access to basic public services. The gap in 
research lies, therefore, in the fact that there has yet to be a systematic approach to regional 
differences in honor culture across Brazil.  
 The present study seeks to address these questions by systematically analyzing 
differences in patterns of honor culture across regions of Brazil. Regional differences in honor-
type attitudes and behaviors have already been documented across the U.S., though, as a whole 
the U.S. is probably not considered an honor culture. However, many scholars consider Brazil to 
be an honor country; yet, they have not explored any variation in such a large and diverse 
country. Therefore, this study focuses on the kind of cultural differences that exist in the context 
of different regions of Brazil. 
The Present Study 
The goal was to use a large-scale representative survey with respondents from different 
regions of Brazil. We were confident that, because theses respondents are from different 
municipalities it would be possible to characterize these municipalities based on the response of 
the samples obtained from there. Using established research on honor culture as a guide (Saucier, 
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et al., 2016; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), we examined publicly survey data for items concerning 
attitudes and values indicative of honor culture. To the extent that such attitudinal items reflect a 
coherent syndrome of an honor culture, they ought to have been correlated. Based on these 
clusters of items we created an index, which allowed us to categorize each municipality based on 
the extent of honor culture. Furthermore, we examined the relationship between the score of the 
municipality with the honor index to material conditions in these municipalities (namely, average 
education level, average income, urbanization, perception of violence, and so on). Lastly, we 
tested if these conditions related to presence of honor culture in the predicted way, thus 
explaining the larger or smaller presence of these honor-based cultural norms and attitudes. To 
do this, the present study used data from two main sources.  
 Firstly, we used the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), a survey conducted 
by the Vanderbilt University, which has the objective of measuring political values and 
behaviors in Latin America. These surveys collected, among other things, data on Brazilian 
public opinion about matters regarding honor (e.g. whether or not it is justifiable for a man to hit 
his wife if she has been unfaithful) thus presenting a very useful tool in the analysis proposed by 
this study. Similarly, the survey contained questions about paternalistic views of women, which 
tend to be prevalent in honor cultures, such women are seen as fragile and needing to be 
cherished (Işık, 2008; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).  
Secondly, this study used data from the most recent census in Brazil (2010), collected by 
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), to address demographic and structural 
variables, which should be predictors to the responses to honor questions. The way this was done 
is collapsing answers from individuals coming from the same municipalities in order to observe 
similarities in responses by individuals living in similar conditions. Next, these data were cross-
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referenced with data from the census to investigate whether or not these municipalities fall under 
the pre-existing conditions described by Nisbett and Cohen (1996) in which honor cultures are 
created.  
 With this data, the intent was to create a form of municipal level “honor index” which 
was to be used to characterize municipalities as being high or low in honor culture. This index 
was overlapped with what we considered to be relevant predictors of each of these municipalities 
such as the level of urbanization, average income, education, crime rates, etc. In doing so, we 
hoped to find any sort of relevant correlations between these relevant predictors and the presence 
of honor culture in each municipality. One must be mindful that the data obtained from these 
surveys are not available for all of Brazil, but for only 110 municipalities, thus making it 
important to analyze how representative of each state/region these data are.  
 In sum, the attempt made by this study was to systematically analyze the presence of 
honor culture in different municipalities of Brazil as well as look for similarities between those 
municipalities that could predict the presence or absence of this honor culture within them. Also, 
we attempted to answer questions about the association of honor culture with variables such as 
immigration background, social class, and education. In doing so, we hoped to analyze 
separately the influence of social background as well as the influence of cultural background on 
the attitudes of individuals raised or living in an honor-type society. Lastly, we computed 
correlations between crime rates, general violence indexes and general feeling of safety 
 with honor culture. 
Part 1: Construction of municipal-level honor index 
Data 
To create an honor index, we used public opinion data, which were representative of 
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different municipalities. Specifically, we relied on a representative survey conducted by 
Vanderbilt University. The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) performs a 
biannual survey named The AmericasBarometer, whose goal is to create a measurement of 
democratic values and behaviors on the American continent. This survey is conducted using 
national probability samples in 22 countries with over 50,000 interviews (LAPOP, 2012). For the 
present purposes, we focused on LAPOP’s 2012 Brazil installment. This data set comprised 
interviews with 1500 people from 107 municipalities located in every Brazilian state. Table 1 
summarizes the characteristics of all municipalities included in the present research. In order to 
ensure an accurate representation of each municipality according to its population, racial groups, 
social class, etc. the research used stratified random sampling. From most municipalities, the 
LAPOP included 11 to 13 respondents (95 municipalities); from some municipalities 24 
respondents (5 municipalities), from others 36 respondents (4 municipalities), from one 
municipality (São Paulo) 71 respondents.  
From this survey, we used responses to questions about honor-related issues. Because the 
conventional concept of honor is disproportionately oriented toward male honor, we also 
selected response to items measuring benevolent sexism in order to be able distinguish the 
effects of honor culture, and cultural sexism. Benevolent sexism is one component of Glick and 
Fiske’s (1996) theory of ambivalent sexism. This model holds that many people hold seemingly 
contradictory beliefs about women, implying that they are fragile and should be cherished and 
taken care of (benevolent sexism), as well as that they are in various ways inferior to and less 
deserving than men (hostile sexism) (Dória, 1994; Işık, 2008; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Sexism 
items were available in the 2014 installment of the LAPOP, which, similar to the 2012 data set, 
comprised 1500 respondents from 103 municipalities located in every Brazilian state, with data 
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having been generated based on stratified random sampling as well.  
Honor Variables 
From the 2012 LAPOP we identified four items that, based on the literature, reflected 
concerns and attitudes relating to honor. All four questions asked respondents to imagine a 
hypothetical scenario. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they approved or understood 
if a husband beats his wife after she was unfaithful; if a father beats his children in order to 
discipline them; if a person kills someone who sexually abused their child; and if someone kills 
another person who threatens the community. These items reflect concerns with the control and 
punishment of wives who tarnish the honor of the family through their behavior (Vandello & 
Cohen, 2003); concerns with male head of households demonstrating that they are in control of 
their families (Cooney, 2014); concerns with revenge in the face of harm to one’s family, 
especially in a situation with weak or absent law enforcement (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 
2002; Santos, 2012), and concerns with violent removal of threats and defense of the self in 
one’s community (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). Also, research has shown that, because honor culture 
is usually linked distrust of local authorities to protect one’s community, people tend to approve 
of citizens taking the law in their owns hands (Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 
1996; Souza, 2015). All four items clearly related to an approval of violence as a proper means 
of ensuring personal honor and safety (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). For each scenario, respondents 
indicated whether they “would approve” (1), “would not approve, but understand” (2), or “would 
neither approve nor understand” (3). In the total 2012 sample, all four items were substantially 
correlated, with rank-correlations ranging from Spearman r = .17 (first and second item) to 




As explained earlier, since our honor items were focused primarily on male honor, we 
also selected items reflecting sexist beliefs about women, because honor beliefs and sexist beliefs 
tend to be correlated (Işık, 2008; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). We specifically focused on 
benevolent sexism which focuses on male beliefs that women are fragile and should be cherished 
and protected (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Benevolent sexist beliefs are by their very nature 
evaluatively positive; that is, they seek to convey a favorable sentiment even when they belittle 
and disempower women. Benevolent sexism exists in contrast to hostile or misogynist beliefs 
about women, two sentiments present in honor cultures. In honor cultures, men are expected to 
be the protector and providers; hence, this concept seems particularly suitable for inclusion in the 
present study. 
We generated a municipal benevolent sexism score, similarly to honor scores. To assess 
benevolent sexism, we used two questions from the LAPOP. The first question asked 
respondents to what extent they thought that women are, in general, more sensitive and 
compassionate than men; the second question asked whether they believed that, in the event of a 
catastrophe, women should be rescued first. In line with Glick and Fiske’s concept, both items 
reflect evaluatively positive sentiments, but also cast women as more passive and less resilient. 
Respondents rated their agreement on a seven-point scale with 1 ‘strongly disagree’ and 7 
‘strongly agree,’ with questions being substantially correlated with each other, r = .32.  
Creating the index 
To generate a municipal-level index we took advantage of the fact that respondents had 
been sampled randomly from within each of the 107 municipalities. To generate an honor index, 
we re-coded the four honor-related items, such that each was dichotomized. Respondents who 
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rejected the scenario entirely, that is, who neither approved nor understood, received a 0. 
Respondents who either approved, or who understood but did not approve received a 1. For each 
participant, the four responses were combined into scores. All scores from respondents from the 
same municipality were subsequently averaged, which provided the basis for a municipal-level 
score. For convenience, the resulting municipality averages were multiplied by 100 such that the 
resulting municipality honor score could range from 0 to 100. The scores obtained from each 
municipality ranged from 0 to 89.58, with a mean of 49.97, and a standard deviation of 17.71 
demonstrating the expected variability between clusters. The skewness of -.43 shows that the 
distribution is only slightly skewed to the right, which is consistent with the affirmation that 
Brazilian’s in general have high honor concerns, but nowhere near enough to label it as an honor 
culture as a whole. The honor scores for each of the 107 municipalities are summarized in Table 
2.  
Likewise, we averaged the two benevolent-sexism responses for each respondent from 
the 2014 data sets, and subsequently aggregating them to the municipal level, we created a 
benevolent sexism score. This procedure resulted in benevolent sexism scores for 107 
municipalities. The mean of this score was clearly located toward the upper end of the seven-
point scale that the original respondents had used, M = 5.36 (SD = 0.66), ranging from 2.96 to 
6.54. Most municipalities were present in both the 2012 and 2014 samples, leaving our final 
dataset with 110 municipalities total. 
Lastly, we examined the association between our municipal honor score and the 
benevolent sexism score. Other than anticipated, the correlation was small and non-significant, r 
(103) = .04, p = .73. This finding did not support the idea that honor culture and benevolent 
sexism were inherently confounded. Yet, it did provide us with the opportunity to observe 
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whether community-levels of benevolent sexism would serve as separate predictors of critical 
consequences of honor culture (see Part 3). 
Part 2: Predicting variation in the honor index 
Based on the framework proposed by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), our goal was to examine 
variables predicting variation in the municipal honor index. These authors proposed that honor 
culture was largely the result of a society adapting to materially and socially challenging 
circumstances. Specifically, the authors maintained that weak law enforcement would promote 
individuals not only defending themselves, but also developing a mindset and reputation 
(“honor”) according to which they would not be challenged. Thus, to extent that the state 
authority is weak or ineffective in certain municipalities, we expect the honor index to be high. 
We expected community perceptions of authorities, especially their trust in authorities, to predict 
lower honor scores. Likewise, community perceptions of danger and low safety should be related 
to higher honor scores in a municipality.  
When resources are scarce, the motivation to defend others and maintain one’s honor 
should be high (Henry, 2009). A sense of honor is less of a priority among the affluent as there is 
less pressure to having to protect one’s possession. Therefore, it is expected that honor scores 
would be higher in less affluent municipalities than in affluent municipalities. Specifically, honor 
cultures should be high in municipalities with lower average wages, inadequate living situations 
and low education.  
Because honor culture, at least in the rendering of Nisbett and Cohen (1996), seems to be 
primarily oriented toward men, we also used the sex ratio of Brazilian municipalities as a 
predictor. Researchers have suggested that hyper-masculine attitudes, which are typical of honor 
cultures, are expected from communities in which the sex-ratio favors males (Courtwright, 1996; 
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Mahalingam, 2007).  
In addition, we used the general demographic variables such as race, which is closely 
associated with social class. Brazilian Census data shows that people who self-report as black or 
multiethnic represent 76% of the 10% lowest incomes and 17.4% of the 1% highest income, 
which means they are underrepresented among the richest and overrepresented among the 
poorest, keeping in mind that those two groups represent 53.6% of the total population (IBGE, 
2015). Lastly, regarding rural percentage, studies in the United States show that honor attitudes 
are higher among people living in rural communities, thus motivating us to observe if there is a 
similar pattern in Brazil (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). 
Data 
To test these predictions, we examined municipality-level predictors of the honor index. 
Because the municipality was the unit of analysis, we relied on official census data whenever 
possible. Specifically, from the 2010 Census data collected by the IBGE, we obtained municipal 
level data on sex (proportion of men relative to women), and, as a measure of social class and 
community affluence, the proportion of households with adequate sanitation. From the IBGE we 
also used data on the average income of men and women, as well as the proportion of rural areas 
within the municipality. Also, from the IBGE we obtained data on the proportion of different 
racial groups in each municipality, specifically the proportion of blacks, multiethnics, Asian and 
indigenous, with the proportion of Europeans/whites serving as the reference category.  
Lastly, we picked four responses to questions from the LAPOP survey that inquired about 
environmental perceptions and concerns of the respondent’s community. Specifically, these 
variables asked respondents the extent to which they thought people from their community were 
trustworthy; the extent to which they thought their community was violent compared to other 
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communities; the extent to which they felt safe regarding the possibility of themselves being 
victims of a crime; and the extent to which they were confident authorities would punish 
criminals if they were victims of a crime. The rating responses to the questions regarding trust in 
authorities, trust in people in the neighborhood, and perceived safety from crime were reverse 
coded from the original. Thus, respondents indicated their responses on a four-point scale with 1 
“Not at all trustworthy,” and 4 “Very trustworthy” for the trust questions, and responses to the 
safety question 1 “Not at all safe” and 4 “Very safe.” Similar, respondents used a three-point 
scale to indicate their perceptions, which after reversal from the original, amounted to 1 
indicating "Not at all violent” and 3 “Very violent.” The use of these variables is consistent with 
previous research that indicates those attitudes are associated with honor culture (Cooney, 2014; 
Dória, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Souza, 2015). Table 1 shows the descriptive data obtained 
from all the variables used in this analysis. 
Results  
Table 3 summarizes the results from a regression analysis predicting municipal level 
honor scores. First, we observed that municipalities with a higher share of households with 
adequate sanitation had lower honor scores. In other words, poorer municipalities were more 
likely to have a stronger honor culture. This is consistent with research that argues honor 
attitudes and honor culture are a form of compensating for lower social status (Henry, 2009). 
Interestingly, none of the other two variables reflecting community affluence (male average 
incomes, education) were related to honor culture. It is difficult to explain why the latter 
variables did not emerge as predictors, even though the direction of the Pearson correlation was 
as expected. Likely, their effect on culture is weak. Moreover, for men it might be in particular 
relative income, not the absolute income that leads to a sense of deprivation and need to 
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compensate. In that sense, predictors such as adequate sanitation might be a more precise 
predictor, since it reflects environmental difficulties and deprivations, which could present the 
necessary conditions for honor culture.     
 Table 3 also shows a substantial association between honor scores and trust in authorities 
such that municipalities with higher trust in authorities were lower in honor culture. This finding 
is consistent with the notion that honor cultures originated in part from an environment in which 
authorities were seen as inefficient or corrupt (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Other variables did not 
yield any significant effect in this model. Specifically, percentage of rural areas, race and sex 
ratio did not predict honor scores in these communities, contrary to expectation. Perception of 
safety had a significant effect on honor scores in the zero order correlations, but those effects 
disappeared once we used other control variables. 
 We repeated this regression analysis predicting municipal benevolent sexism scores (see 
Table 4). The regression analysis showed no significant correlations between honor scores and 
benevolent sexism, contrary to our predictions. In the zero-order correlations, higher levels of 
education and adequate sanitation both had negative effects on benevolent sexism, but as we 
controlled for all other variables, this relationship disappeared for education, though it remained 
for adequate sanitation. We found higher proportions of adequate sanitation in the municipality 
to relate to lower levels of benevolent sexism. However, none of the variable relating to 
authorities or community safety showed any relationship with benevolent sexism. Surprisingly, 
municipalities with higher proportions of indigenous people were higher in benevolent sexism. 
This observation is difficult to explain, and might be an artifact, because the share of indigenous 
people is generally extremely low (mean 9%).  
At least equally surprising was the observation that municipalities with more men than 
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women (a positive sex ratio) exhibited lower levels of benevolent sexism. Again, the cause of 
this finding is not entirely clear. However, because benevolent sexism reflects a positive 
sentiment toward women, not a negative one, it is possible that in male-dominated environments 
(those with higher sex ratios) negative attitudes toward women are more prevalent. In other 
words, based on Glick and Fiske’s (1996) distinction of benevolent and hostile sexism, it is 
possible that municipalities low in benevolent sexism would have scored higher in hostile 
sexism. Since proportion of adequate sanitation also had a significant correlation with benevolent 
sexism, this could be an indication that poor material conditions and a poverty environment 
could be a condition for benevolent sexism attitudes to emerge. 
Part 3: The honor index as predictor of community-level characteristics 
Having examined possible causes for honor culture, we now attempted to predict 
consequences of honor culture consistent with the previous literature on the subject. To be 
precise, we attempted to find a relationship between honor culture, on the one hand, and 
violence, gun ownership and desire to own guns, on the other hand. Along with our municipal 
honor score, we employed our benevolent sexism index (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Işık, 2008). 
First, violence rates should be associated with honor scores. Research has found that 
honor cultures are normally cultures in which there are higher levels of violence than non-honor 
cultures, and honor disputes have been found to be one of the explanations to violence in some 
regions of Brazil (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Santos, 2012; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). 
Likewise, honor cultures tend to have a higher suicide rates than non-honor cultures, due to the 
fact that people in honor cultures who suffer from emotional problems such as depression are 
unlikely to seek help, because they feel this would damage one’s reputation before others 
(Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2014). This observation motivated us to look for a relationship 
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between suicides and honor scores. 
 Regarding gun possession, research has shown that regions with large numbers of gun 
owners are typically regions in which people also hold honor related attitudes, likely a 
consequence of people’s distrust in authorities and hyper masculine attitudes (Felson & Pare, 
2010). Since gun ownership is also a very present feature of honor culture, we attempted to see 
the relationship between gun violence and honor culture, while controlling for gun ownership. 
Data 
 In order to determine how violence correlates with honor culture, we used data from the 
Violence Map NGO and the Brazilian Census from 2010. The goal was to observe how the 
honor score for each municipality predicted violent, deaths and homicides by firearm and sexual 
violence. Whereas as the homicide/deaths as categories are self-explanatory, sexual violence was 
defined as every kind of sexual crime, including rape, sexual harassment, sexual assault, sexual 
exploitation (i.e., pandering), indecency and child pornography (Waiselfisz, 2012). We attempted 
to observe how these correlations would play out, while controlling for variables such as social 
class, gun ownership, ethnicity and sex ratio. 
When predicting violence, we used four different types of violence as dependent 
variables, while also controlling for several other potential predictors, such as race, social class, 
education, etc. These types were: violent deaths (regardless of cause or intent), death by firearm 
(regardless of whether intentional or not), homicide by firearm, and sexual violence. Violent 
death is defined by the IBGE as death by external, not natural causes such as car accidents, 
drowning, suicides, homicides, accidental falling, and so on (IBGE, 2015).  
To assess respondents’ relationship with firearms, we selected two questions regarding 
attitudes towards gun ownership from the survey, asking whether the respondent owned a gun or 
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whether they wished to own one. In Brazil, it is much more difficult and expensive to legally 
own a gun than in the U.S. Specifically, Brazilian law states that it is illegal for citizens to own 
and carry guns unless they have a specific reason for needing to protect themselves. But even 
then, there is a long bureaucratic process to register a gun, including proof of residence, mental 
sanity, clean criminal record and a BRL91.35 (U$28.3) tax for registering the gun and an 
additional BRL1522.49 (U$471.44) tax to purchase a permit to carry it. With that said, the 
question regarding the wish to own a gun may present a more solid case than actually owning 
them, since actual ownership has other restrictions.  
Results 
Contrary to prediction, the regression analysis demonstrated no significant correlation 
between honor scores and violent deaths, as demonstrated in Table 5. The proportion of blacks 
within a municipality only link with honor scores when examining zero-order correlations, but 
controlling for other variables eliminated this effect. Once again, adequate sanitation and the 
proportion of multiethnic individuals emerged as significant predictors. Regarding adequate 
sanitation, the negative association with violent death rates is consistent with the notion that 
people in poverty conditions are more vulnerable to violence and accidents. However, the strong 
negative correlation between the proportion of multiethnics and violent deaths is surprising. 
Multiethnic people are overrepresented in the poorest strata of Brazilian society; however, this 
analysis suggests that higher proportions of this population is linked to lower violent deaths even 
though we already control for multiple indicators of social class. 
The next regression model, summarized in Table 6, predicted deaths by firearms based on 
the same variables. Results showed a significant correlation between deaths by firearm and 
municipal honor scores, similar to previous research conducted in the U.S. (Felson & Pare, 
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2010). Surprisingly, sex ratio was significant, with higher rates of women (a negative sex ratio) 
being related to higher rates of gun deaths. Again, inadequate sanitation predicted firearm deaths, 
confirming the link between economic deprivation and higher rates of violence. Race also had a 
significant effect, especially the proportion of blacks, even when social class variables such as 
adequate sanitation, income, and education, were controlled for. Surprisingly, neither proportion 
of rural areas (i.e. areas with high gun ownership) nor rates of gun ownership themselves had any 
significant effect in predicting these types of deaths.  
The next analysis focused on a subcategory of firearm deaths, namely, homicides by 
firearm. The extent that violent deaths in general, or deaths by firearm also include suicides and 
accidental killings, homicide by firearm is a variable that should be most sensitive to honor 
cultures encouraging violent retaliation in the face of challenges to one’s honor (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1994; Courtwright, 1996; Santos, 2012). Table 7 reports the results of this regression 
analysis. Prominently, higher honor scores were linked to higher rates of homicides by firearms, 
thus confirming a critical prediction. Unexpectedly, but as in the previous analysis, higher rates 
of women relative to men (i.e. a negative sex ratio) were associated higher rates of homicides by 
firearm, though this effect disappeared when control for confounding variables. Other predictors 
emerged similarly to the findings already reported for the prediction of death by firearm. 
 A separate analysis for suicide rates yielded unexpected results. Firstly, contrary to our 
prediction, honor scores did not predict suicide rates. Yet, suicide rates were negatively 
correlated with all non-white races, indicating that those of European descent are more likely to 
commit suicide in Brazil. Lastly, gun ownership was highly correlated with suicide rates, which 
is to be expected, since availability of guns makes committing suicide an easier task (see also 
Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2014). Note that suicide rates in Brazil are very skewed (1.774), 
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meaning that for the most part, municipal suicide rates are very low, regardless of the level of 
honor culture within a municipality.  
Next, we used a regression analysis to predict gun ownership (see Table 9). There was a 
positive correlation between gun ownership and municipal honor scores; yet, when controlling 
for other variables, this correlation became non-significant. We obtained the similar results when 
using adequate sanitation: The negative association with gun ownership did not remain 
significant once we controlled for other variables.  
The share of rural areas within a municipality was a significant predictor of gun 
ownership. This is consistent with literature showing that people living in rural and frontier-like 
areas are more likely to own guns (Felson & Pare, 2010; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Under the 
constraints imposed on gun ownership by the Brazilian state, this suggests that rural populations 
seem to feel more in need of self-protection. And given the cost of gun ownership in Brazil, this 
suggests that owning a gun is a high priority for those living in rural areas. This finding is also 
consistent with the premise of Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) theory of honor culture, namely that 
the need for self-protection is high when law enforcement is low, as tends to be the case in large 
rural areas in Brazil, in which several conflicts exist and the state is unable to manage them 
(Brumer & Santos, 2006). Perception of safety and violence were not significantly correlated 
with gun ownership. This has to be interpreted in the context of Brazil’s stringent laws regarding 
gun ownership, which make it very difficult and expensive for people to legally own guns. Even 
though people might feel unsafe, they cannot legally own a gun.  
Because gun ownership itself is an exception in Brazil, we focused on people’s desire to 
own a gun, regardless of whether people have access to one or not. The pertinent regression 
analysis is summarized Table 10. There was a strong link between the desire to own a gun and 
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municipal honor scores, even when controlling for variables such as rates of violence and 
predictors of social class. Perception of safety and trust in neighbors showed significant 
correlations with desire to own a gun, but when using control variables those two became non-
significant. Actual violent deaths rates had a significant effect on willingness to own a gun, but a 
surprising effect appeared when using firearm homicide rates as predictors. There was a negative 
correlation with this variable and willingness to own a gun, which could suggest that perhaps the 
idea of needing a firearm is be more related to status and subjective perceptions, rather than 
actual material conditions of violence.    
 Lastly, to examine the scope of interpersonal violence that honor scores might predict, we 
examine the rate of sexual violence reported for a particular municipality. There were a number 
of zero-order correlations, such that mean income, mean education, the share of rural areas, the 
proportion of indigenous individuals as well as the sex ratio were linked with the incidence of 
sexual violence. Yet, once all variables were entered into the same regression equation, none of 
these effects persisted.  
Discussion  
 When Bourdieu first coined the terms symbolic capital, he referred to the manner in 
which individuals exert authority and competence (Bourdieu, 2011). In honor cultures, an 
individual’s symbolic capital is the acquired honor, the respect one inspires in others. Especially 
for men, honor translates into a need to project an image of being fearless and a force to be 
reckoned with, which is the measure of symbolic power. However, the fragility of status in this 
type of culture cannot be explained by Bourdieu’s theory. In Bourdieu, symbolic power is 
exerted through cultural forms of domination, which are validated by institutions and cultural 
norm (2011). Although this is partly true for honor cultures in the sense that specific cultural 
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norms ascribe status, the kind of power obtained through honor is extremely fragile, and is 
constantly under threat of challenge. The fact that honor is so easily lost when it is challenged 
explains why it must be so fiercely and violently defended (Grzyb, 2016). With that, we began to 
look for reasons that could explain the emergence of honor culture in Brazil, and how it affected 
interpersonal relationships, particularly those pertaining to violence, even symbolic violence. 
 We created an honor index to test two main hypotheses. The first was to challenge 
previous studies that treated a country as large and culturally diverse as Brazil as a homogenous 
honor culture. We believe that a country with a vast and varied immigration history, as well as 
great differences in material conditions within itself, would likely have a high regional variability 
in honor concerns. This hypothesis was formulated based on studies conducted in the United 
States in which high levels of honor concerns existed in locations with specific material and 
historical conditions (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Much like the United States, Brazil is a large 
country with material inequalities and similar immigration patterns.  
The second hypothesis consisted in testing previous affirmations by previous research 
that culture and particularly honor culture is an adaptation to a dangerous environment, in which 
it is vital to be feared and respected, due to constant risks to one’s life and livelihood (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1994). Since Brazil has several locations with very high poverty as well as high violence 
rates, it seemed plausible to assume that we could reproduce this study there, and test if those 
material conditions predicted honor scores. Also, research shows that honor culture cannot only 
be caused by, but also have consequences such as high violence rates and gun ownership (Felson 
& Pare, 2010; Santos, 2012; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). 
Our research found support for our first hypothesis. The data showed that there is great 
variability between municipalities, as we expected. Brazil is a country of continental dimensions 
35 
 
and large diversity in races and cultures, as well as being massively unequal in terms of 
infrastructure and wealth. In that sense, it was expected that honor culture might present itself 
differently in each municipality, depending on the conditions of these municipalities.  
When testing our second hypothesis, we managed to confirm some aspects of honor 
culture as predicted based on the work of Nisbett and Cohen (1996).  Municipalities with greater 
material wealth (assessed via higher proportion of adequate sanitation in the home), for instance, 
showed lower levels of honor culture, consistent with people of lower social class being more 
concerned with honor (Henry, 2009). However, the fact that other indicators of social class, 
specially income and education, did not play any role does not allow the conclusion that material 
conditions do not matter at all. Rather, it is possible that individuals’ material condition relative 
to that of their neighbors, might orient individuals more toward honor. Future research should 
examine this possibility.   
Consistent with previous research (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994), we found that distrust in 
authorities predicted honor culture. Note that this predictor was clearly significant, whereas some 
of the socio-economic predictors were not (see above). This could be an indicator that honor 
culture in Brazil has more to do with people’s perceptions of their social environment than with 
the material conditions themselves. That is, whereas Nisbett and Cohen (1996) focus on the 
notion that honor culture exists as an adaptation to a harsh environment, the fact that lack of trust 
is a predictor suggests that this cannot be the complete story. In this context it is remarkable that 
some predictions based on the harsh-condition perspective are not born out. Whereas previous 
research has located honor cultures primarily in more rural areas (which tend to be poorer), the 
present investigation did not produce any evidence for this notion.  
Likewise, when looking at the relationship of honor culture and willingness to own a gun 
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our results confirmed some assumptions, and contradicted others. Our index of honor culture 
predicted municipal-level desire to own a gun, even when we controlled for variables that would 
generally increase people’s motivation to arm themselves, such as perception of lack of security 
and high rates of violence in the community (Felson & Pare, 2010). To be sure, there was an 
association between the violent death rate in the municipality and the desire to own guns. 
However, if one assumes that guns may primarily be thought of as facilitating interpersonal 
aggression, it was peculiar that the desire to own guns was higher in those communities with 
lower levels of homicides committee through the use of firearms. If guns are to deter gun 
violence against the person, this finding is not easy to explain. However, it is always possible 
that people who observe various types of violent deaths around themselves may feel safer if they 
own a gun, regardless of whether the gun can actually be instrumental in deterring or repelling 
gun violence. Whereas plausible, this notion is contradicted by the idea that community 
perception of security and violence were not linked with the desire to own guns.  
Arguably, this dissociation from the actual security condition is more compatible with the 
idea that owning a gun is a cultural goal. Those who own guns may gain social status and feel 
respected, regardless of their personal sense of security. Recall that Henry (2009) argued that 
those of low status use honor culture to compensate for their material deprivation. That is, gun 
ownership might be more about gaining respect. And perhaps gaining respect is more of a 
priority when individuals live in an environment in which the violent death rate is high, where 
life is cheap.  
Furthermore, the relationship between honor scores and benevolent sexism also 
contradicted previous research on the subject (Işık, 2008). Municipal honor scores and municipal 
benevolent scores were not related to one another. However, some scholars would argue that 
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sexism in Latin America is more prominently hostile than benevolent (Stevens, 1973). This 
could explain why honor culture in Brazil does not relate to benevolent sexism: Brazilian 
communities high in honor culture may harbor more demeaning and aggressive feelings towards 
women (Stevens, 1973; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Contradictory beliefs on female chastity in 
Brazil, that is, the feeling that women need to be chaste and pure while at the same time men 
need to be womanizers might explain this (Dória, 1994; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). People 
living in honor cultures in Brazil my not see women as to be cherished and needing to be 
protected, but as potential threats to their honor, as someone who needs to be controlled.  
Only one variable in our model predicted benevolent sexism: the sex ratio. However, this 
correlation was opposite to what was expected. Research shows that such attitudes are usually 
present in cultures where there are more men than women; that is, men seem to cherish women 
more (but also relegate them to powerless positions in society) where there are more men around 
(Guttentag & Secord, 1983). O’Brien (1991) showed that in societies in which sex ratios were 
low (i.e., there were more women than men), women tended to hold more positions of power and 
did not perform traditional gender roles. This made men feel threatened and thus tended to 
exhibit hostile sexist attitudes, which also seemed to translate into higher rates of rape (O’Brien, 
1991). 
Yet, our model showed that benevolent sexism was particularly strong where there were 
more women relative to men. It is difficult to explain why this finding emerged. One can 
speculate that the attitudes used in the present study were indeed perceived as very favorably by 
women. In other words, in municipalities with more women than men our index might simply 
show that attitudes toward women were more favorable than in municipalities in which there 
were more men than women. This, however, would require a re-interpretation of benevolent that 
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starkly differs from what Glick and Fiske (1996) intended.  
The models in which we used honor culture as a predictor of violence produced 
particularly interesting results. Contrary to expectation, municipal honor scores did not predict 
rates of violent deaths. These deaths were only explained by proportion of adequate sanitation, 
which could very well mean that people with poor infrastructure are simply more susceptible to 
these types of deaths, which include accidents, suicides as well as homicides. In this sense, the 
variable “violent deaths” might be simply too broad a variable to be diagnostic of the effects of 
honor culture. One could assume that using homicide rates regardless of whether the perpetrator 
used a gun, another weapon or his bare hands, and that assumption would be correct. Although 
the IBGE has data on homicide coefficients, they have this information only for states, not 
municipalities. This is probably so because several homicides are not resolved in Brazil, so it is 
possible that some of the deaths listed as accidents could actually be murders. With regard to 
homicides with firearm, it is most likely easier to determine that it was a homicide.  
Confirming this idea, municipal honor scores did predict the rate of death by firearm, that 
is, a variable that focuses on a more specific kind of death that does involve violence directed at 
people. These findings are strengthened by the fact that we controlled for variables that predicted 
social class as well as gun ownership. Regardless of social class, when guns are present in a 
Brazilian honor society, there were more deaths, similarly to the U.S. (Felson & Pare, 2010). 
Deaths by firearm were also more prevalent in places without adequate sanitation confirming 
that poor communities are usually more violent. Similarly, our results confirmed that 
municipalities with a greater proportion of Black individuals showed higher levels of deaths by 
firearms, even when indicators of social class were controlled.  
Census and Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) data shows that people of 
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African descent in Brazil are widely overrepresented in national statistics of poverty, prison 
population and homicide victims, as well as underrepresented amongst the wealthy and college 
educated (Waiselfisz, 2012). Whereas this would suggest that our socio-economic municipal 
variables (adequate sanitation, education, income) should have explained any effect of this, the 
fact that the share of the Black continues to predict gun deaths, suggests that other factors might 
be in play, even those are not assessed in the present study. Perhaps similarly surprising in this 
analysis was the fact that the rate of gun deaths was greater in municipalities with a greater 
proportion of women than men. Messer and Sampson (1991) argue that a positive sex ratio (i.e., 
more men than women) had an effect on family disruption, which had an effect on violence rates. 
Likewise, Courtwright (1996) argued that societies in which there were high levels of single 
males tend to be more violent. This means that a sex ratio favoring males should be linked to 
higher rates of violence; yet, our model showed the exact opposite.     
After looking at these two broader categories, we analyzed more specific categories of 
violence, namely suicides, sexual violence and homicides with firearms. Contrary to previous 
research on the subject, suicide rates were not predicted by honor scores. In our model, only gun 
ownership predicted suicides, which is expected. Research has shown that people who come 
from honor cultures tend to commit suicide more often, because they do not seek help in fear of 
appearing weak (Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2014). However, this does not seem to occur in 
Brazilian honor cultures. There seem to be two main possible explanations for this. Firstly, it is 
likely that not having easy access to guns discourage people from killing themselves, as other 
methods of suicide required more planning, more effort and more time to change one’s mind. 
Previous research on suicide in honor culture has focused typically on the southern U.S., whereas 
it is generally easy to obtain a gun. In contrast, in Brazil acquiring a gun is enormously difficult.  
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The second explanation is of a cultural and religious aspect. There have been studies that 
show that people in Protestant communities are more likely to commit suicide than in Catholic 
communities (Becker & Woessmann, 2011). The explanation is that Protestants tend to live in 
communities which are more individualistic, whereas Catholics tend to have closer ties to their 
peers (Becker & Woessmann, 2011). Also, Protestant and Catholic creeds differ in regards to 
afterlife – Protestants tend to believe that the fate of the individual in the afterlife is already 
defined, whereas Catholics believe that their deeds define it -, which could discourage Catholics 
to commit suicide more than protestants (Becker & Woessmann, 2011). The study by Crowder 
and Kemmelmeier (2014) did not control for religion, so it is possible that there is an explanation 
for the difference in suicides in honor cultures in Brazil and the U.S. in that sense. 
Sexual violence was also not explained by any of our predictors, even though some of 
them had significant zero order correlations. One odd finding in this model was the direction of 
the correlation between education and sexual violence. There was a positive correlation, which 
could be explained by stating that these cases of sexual violence are only the ones who are 
reported. Most likely, women of higher education tend to report more cases of sexual assault, not 
because they are victims more often, but because they know the ways and have the confidence to 
report, whereas poorer, uneducated women might be afraid or might not be able to support 
themselves without their husband. It is important to point out that none of these correlations held 
for sexual violence control variables were used in the model.  
Though neither suicide rates nor sexual violence correlate as expected, homicide rates 
with firearms correlated greatly. In fact, all the same predictors for death by firearms were 
significant for homicides. This is consistent with research that found violence as being one of the 
main consequences for honor culture and particularly in Brazil (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cooney, 
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2014; Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Brazilian literature on the subject 
usually refers to honor culture in Brazil as being prominent in the North and Northeast of Brazil, 
where material conditions are harsher. “Cleansing honor with blood” is a well-known expression 
for regaining honor through violent means in those regions. However, our study found that honor 
attitudes exist in the South, where conditions are not necessarily as harsh as in the North and 
Northeast. Dessen and Torres (2002) for instance, observed that the “cabocla” and “crioula” 
cultures present in the North and Northeast actually were patriarchal, honor based societies, but 
did not find this in “gaúcha” cultures in the South.  
To be sure, there are studies that have argued that Italian immigrants in the 19th Century 
in Southern Brazil had a value system that was based on honor which used, for instance, violent 
methods to reestablish a harmed reputation (Vendrame, 2013. However, our study managed to 
find current data to support the argument that some municipalities in the South of Brazil also 
scored high in honor culture. A possible explanation for this is Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) 
argument of herding cultures being more prominently honor cultures, since the main economic 
activities for these regions is precisely herding. Unfortunately, without specific data on 
municipality’s main economic activities, it is hard to make these assumptions. Further research 
could benefit from the honor index we created and test for this. 
Lastly, honor culture was a strong predictor of homicides. We managed to find that rates 
of homicides were explained by honor scores, even when controlling for variables of Social 
class. However, although there have been studies that have used honor as predictors of violence, 
they tend to focus on specific Brazilian regions, namely, the North and Northeast (Souza, 2015; 
Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Northeastern municipalities of Brazil are broadly 
referred to as being honor cultures, however this is not based on specific data measuring honor 
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concerns, but in a general sentiment that these regions are honor cultures. It is possible that much 
of Brazilian literature in the subject focuses on the Northeast due to its past with the 
“Coronelismo” system (Leal, 2012). Since these types of societies were very violent and 
possessed a non-sate justice code, as well as a value system based on reputation, it is 
understandable why these are the first regions of Brazil to come to mind when discussing honor 
culture in Brazil. Another explanation is that, since honor culture is regarded as being originated 
from poverty and an absence of the state, these regions are more studied in that regard. The 
consequences of this is that studies normally do not analyze honor violence elsewhere. 
The present study, however, found that a general feeling that authorities are unhelpful 
also matters in predicting honor culture, even when we control for material conditions. Our 
model showed that municipalities in the South such as Porto Alegre actually had higher honor 
scores than Recife, the capital of Pernambuco where studies on honor killings were held (Souza, 
2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Hopefully, our findings will help further research 
have a better starting point in discussing honor violence, as well as investigating its presence in 
regions other than North and Northeastern Brazil.  
Limitations 
Among the limitations of this study are the fact that the data we used were not intended 
or this purpose. Although the LAPOP survey is a very extensive survey, it focused only 
marginally on the topics in which this research project was interested. In the future, research 
should attempt to create new surveys to more thoroughly describe honor. Also, the LAPOP only 
gathered data from 110 out of the over 5000 municipalities of Brazil. This lead to some states 
being much less represented than others, even with proportional random sampling. Even though 
this data still gives us a good idea about honor culture in Brazil, future research might want to 
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obtain data from at least 1000 municipalities, in order to have a greater, more representative 
sample. 
Regarding municipal level data, we used adequate sanitation, income and education to 
assess SES in the municipalities but did not use data such as the Human Development Index 
(HDI) to assess community development. Future studies may benefit from using this type of 
data.  
Lastly, we did not have data available pertaining to economic activity in a municipality, 
which kept us from testing for Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) argument of herding and arming 
cultures. Future research should look into this issue some more to generate a stronger test.  
 
Conclusion 
The present study was able to discuss some notions that previous research had not given 
enough attention to. Firstly, we managed to demonstrate that Brazil, even though it is considered 
an honor culture, has great variability in that sense. Also, we attempted to reproduce studies that 
considered honor culture as an adaptation to material conditions. Although some of those notions 
held, our study showed that at times, the same material conditions were not able to predict or 
explain honor culture in Brazil. Instead, perceptions and impressions about the environment – 
which at times were not supported by fact – seemed to have a bigger role in defining honor 
culture.  
Something similar happens when measuring willingness to own a gun, most likely 
meaning that owning a gun is an ascribed form of social status, since they represent power in a 
society with high levels of honor concerns and a low proportion of people who actually own 
guns. Lastly, we challenged some preconceived notions on Brazilian research about honor 
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culture in the North and Northeastern regions of Brazil. Although they are high in honor culture, 
this is not exclusive of them. The index we created will hopefully aid future research on the 
subject, creating a starting point for analyzing consequences of honor culture. 
This research hopefully contributed to Nisbett and Cohen’s research (1996) by showing 
that while material conditions do matter to some extent, collective perceptions on authority’s 
competence matter at least equally. Even so, our study strengthened the argument that honor 
culture is an adaptation to the general circumstances that a community faces, whether they are 
socioeconomic conditions or cultural perceptions. The systematic test of Nisbett and Cohen 
(1996) further developed our understanding of Brazil as a country that is typically considered an 
honor society. Perhaps further research can apply our approach in other alleged honor cultures 
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Table of the means, SD, and range for all of the variables used in the study 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
   Range 
   ____________________ 




Municipal Honor Score 49.97 (17.71) 0 89.58 
Municipal Benevolent Sexism Score 5.36 (0.66) 2.96 6.54 
 
Demographics 
Mean income men 1203.90 (528.03) 468 2907 
Mean income women 842.79 (356.02) 374 2111 
Mean years education 8.45 (1.50) 4.92 12.08 
Urban (%) 84.65 (17.85) 31 100 
Sex Ratio -3.16 (5.60) -14.30 13 
Adequate Sanitation (%) 54.1 (30.2) 0 97.50 
 
Community responses  
Trust in neighbors 2.24 (0.40) 1.2 3.33 
Perception of safety 2.10 (0.43) 1.25 3.42 
Perception of violence 2.43 (0.35) 1.63 3.00 
Trust in authorities 2.86 (0.43) 1.67 3.92 
______________________________________________________________________________ 






Listing of all municipalities with honor scores, by state 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
AC 
 Rio Branco 56.25 
  
AL 
 Satuba 52.08 
 
AM  
 Manaquiri 87.50 
 Codajás 35.42 
 Itacoatiara 56.25 
 Manaus 84.72 
 
AP 
 Macapá 54.48 
 
BA 
 Vera Cruz 35.04 
 Riachão do Jacuípe 61.36 
 Feira de Santana 52.08 
 Salvador 45.83 
 
CE 
 Barreira 29.17 
 Pacujá 60.42 
 Maracanaú 39.02 
 Fortaleza 37.09 
 
DF 




 Vitória 53.60 
 
GO 
 Corumbá de Goiás 52.08 
 Goianápolis 43.75 
 Leopoldo de Bulhões
 56.25 
 Novo Gama 60.42 
 Campinorte 54.17 
 Aparecida de Goiânia
 63.46 
 Campo Alegre de Goiás
 64.58 
 Goiânia 56.25 
 
MA 
 Vitória do Mearim 58.33 
 Imperatriz 66.67 
 São Luís 50.00 
 
MG 
 Sobrália 54.17 
 Taiobeiras 38.46 
 Várzea da Palma 47.92 
 Ouro Fino 47.92 
 João Pinheiro 62.50 
 Betim 62.50 
 Santa Rita do Sapucaí
 47.73 
 Divinópolis 62.50 
 Araxá 43.75 
 Pouso Alegre 18.75 
 Belo Horizonte 34.09 
 
MS 
 Campo Grande  55.30 
 Aquidauana 33.33 
 Corumbá 35.42 
 
MT 
 Nova Brasilândia 43.75 
 Rondonópolis 52.08 
 Cuiabá 47.92 
 
PA 
 Belém 20.83 
 Capanema  47.92 
 Benevides 50.00 
 Barcarena 47.92 
 Marabá 58.33 
 
PB 
 São Miguel de Taipu 77.27 
 Alhandra 61.36 
 Conde 85.42 
 João Pessoa 64.58 
 
PE 
 Santa Maria da Boa Vista
 20.14 
 Caruaru 61.93 
 Petrolina 37.50 
 Jaboatão dos Guararapes
 72.92 
 Recife 45.83 
 
PR 
 Alto Piquiri 56.25 
 Matelândia 45.83 
 Londrina 64.58 
 Curitiba 56.25 
 
RJ 
 Belford Roxo 45.83 
 Queimados 25.00 
 Duque de Caxias 72.92 
 Pinheiral 29.17 
 São Pedro da Aldeia 66.67 
 Volta Redonda 47.92 
 Rio de Janeiro 45.28 
 
RN 
 Parnamirim  29.17 
 Natal 43.75 
  
RO 
 Buritis 50.00 
 Porto Velho 52.08 
 
RR 





 São Gabriel  57.01 
 Santa Maria  82.39 
 Caçapava do Sul 62.88 
 Venâncio Aires 89.58 
 Sant'Ana do Livramento
 42.05 
 Guaíba 51.14 
 Sapucaia do Sul 56.44 
 Serafina Corrêa 62.69 
 Passo Fundo 72.16 
 Porto Alegre 66.15 
 
SC 
 Sombrio 39.58 
 São Bento do Sul 64.58 
 Itapema 47.92 
 Joinville 70.83 
 
SE 
 Itabaiana  72.92 
 Laranjeiras 66.67 




 Álvares Machado 6.25 
 Embu das Artes 16.67 
 Itápolis 8.33 
 Carapicuíba 35.42 
 Guarulhos 14.58 
 Andradina 16.67 
 Ipeúna 14.58 
 Jandira 57.77 
 Pindamonhangaba 42.80 
 Indaiatuba .00 
 São Bernardo do Campo
 47.92 
 São José dos Campos
 25.00 
 São Paulo 53.17 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: AC = Acre; AL = Alagoas; AM = Amazonas; AP= Amapá; BA = Bahia; CE = Ceará; DF 
= Distrito Federal (Brasília); ES = Espírito Santo GO = Goiás; MA = Maranhão; MG = Minas 
Gerais; MS = Mato Grosso do Sul; MT = Mato Grosso; PA = Pará; PB = Paraíba; PE = 
Pernambuco; PR = Paraná; RJ = Rio de Janeiro; RN = Rio Grande do Norte; RO = Rondônia; 





Regression model, predicting honor scores 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Municipal Honor Scores β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Predictors 
Mean income men .08 3.26 (5.17) .53 -.09 
Mean years education .04 0.43 (1.10) .69 -.05 
Adequate sanitation* -.34 -0.21 (0.09) .027 -.23* 
Rural Areas .19 0.21 (0.18) .27 .15 
Black (%) -.12 -23.63 (21.10) .27 -.01 
Multiethnic (%) -.24 -15.94 (8.56) .07 -.08 
Asian (%) -.12 -8.03 (7.89) .31 -.06 
Indigenous (%) -.02 -1.45 (11.65) .90 .14 
Perception of safety  .11 4.52 (5.46) .41 .23* 
Perception of violence -.04 -2.28 (-0.04) .70 -.05 
Trust in neighbors -.03 -1.35 (5.35) .80 -.19 
Trust in authorities** -.30 -12.38 (4.62) .009 -.38*** 
Sex ratio -.17 -0.58 (0.43) .19 -.06 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Note. R2 = .28. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 




 Table 4 
 
Regression model, predicting benevolent sexism 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Municipal Benevolent Sexism β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Predictors 
Municipal honor scores -.03 -0.001 (0.004) .82 .03 
Mean income men -.02 -0.02 (0.20) .91 -.19 
Mean years education -.10 -0.04 (0.04) .35 -.20* 
Adequate sanitation* -.36 -0.008 (0.004) .023 -.26** 
Rural Areas -.07 -0.003 (0.007) .70 .13 
Black (%) -.17 1.23 (0.81) .13 .18 
Multiethnic (%) .25 0.62 (0.33) .068 .18 
Asian (%) .17 0.45 (0.30) .15 -.01 
Indigenous (%)* .27 0.88 (0.44) .05 .09 
Perception of safety -.19 -0.29 (0.21) .17 -.04 
Perception of violence -.07 -0.14 (0.21) .51 -.05 
Trust in neighbors -.11 -0.19 (0.20) .36 -.13 
Trust in authorities .11 0.17 (0.18) .35 .01 
Sex ratio** -.41 -0.05 (0.02) .003 -.09 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Note. R2 = .26. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 







Regression model, predicting violent deaths 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Violent deaths (per 100,000) β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________
Predictors 
Municipality honor score -.04 -0.16 (0.39) .68 .003 
Mean income men .20 31.39 (20.21) .124 .04 
Mean years education .03 1.25 (4.21) .77 -.02 
Adequate sanitation* -.39 -0.89 (0.36) .015 -.16 
Rural Areas .09 0.38 (0.70) .59 .02 
Black (%) .17 124.39 (81.42) .13 .22* 
Multiethnic (%) ** -.37 -90.83 (33.18) .007 -.20* 
Asian (%) .05 12.13 (30.14) .69 .06 
Indigenous (%) -.22 -73.1 (44.47) .10 -.02 
Sex ratio .05 0.66 (1.61) .69 .11 
Gun ownership -.11 -134.45 (124.49) .28 -.08 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Note. R2 = .20. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 








Regression model, predicting death by firearm 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Death by Firearm (per 100,000) β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________
Predictors 
Municipality honor score* .23 0.24 (0.10) .021 .27** 
Mean income men .18 7.87 (5.29) .14 .07 
Mean years education -.08 -0.78 (1.12) .49 -.02 
Adequate sanitation* -.36 -0.25 (0.10) .013 -.21* 
Rural Areas -.10 -0.13 (0.21) .52 -.15 
Black (%) *** .42 83.55 (20.97) <.001 .44*** 
Multiethnic (%) .12 8.84 (8.72) .31 .10 
Asian (%) .12 8.53 (7.80) .30 -.10 
Indigenous (%) -.04 -4.96 (15.55) .75 -.14 
Sex ratio* -.28 -1.10 (0.48) .028 -.26** 
Gun ownership -.04 -13.10 (34.80) .71 -.03 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
Note. R2 = .43. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 







Regression model, predicting homicide by firearm 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Homicide by firearm (per 100,000) β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________
Predictors 
Municipality honor score* .22 0.22 (0.10) .029 .26** 
Mean income men .18 8.15 (5.27) .13 .07 
Mean years education -.07 -0.66 (1.11) .55 -.01 
Adequate sanitation** -.39 -0.26 (0.96) .008 -.22* 
Rural Areas -.12 -0.15 (0.21) .46 -.15 
Black (%) ***  .40 78.91 (20.89) <.001 .43*** 
Multiethnic (%) .11 7.70 (8.69) .38 .10 
Asian (%) .13 8.59 (7.77) .27 -.09 
Indigenous (%) -.04 -4.58 (15.50) .77 -.14 
Sex ratio* -.26 -1.00 (0.48) .040 -.24* 
Gun ownership -.04 -14.34 (34.66) .68 -.03 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Note. R2 = .41. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 







Regression model, predicting Suicide Rates 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Suicide rates (per 100,000) β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________
Predictors 
Municipality honor score .12 0.28 (0.23) .24 .14 
Mean income men -.01 -0.01 (0.96) .27 .14 
Mean years education -.11 -0.25 (0.25) .32 .04 
Adequate sanitation .16 0.02 (0.02) .27 .14 
Rural Areas .20 0.05 (0.04) .21 -.02 
Black (%)* -.21 -10.00 (4.84) .042 -.10 
Multiethnic (%) ** -.36 -5.66 (1.97) .005 -.06 
Asian (%) * -.28 -4.60 (1.79) .012 -.07 
Indigenous (%) *** -.58 -12.43 (2.64) <.001 -.27** 
Sex ratio -.01 -0.01 (0.96) .94 -.11 
Gun ownership* .23 17.91 (7.40) .017 .25** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Note. R2 = .31. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 






Regression model, predicting Gun ownership 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Gun Ownership (%) β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Predictors 
Municipality honor score .18 0.001 (0.00) .13 .23* 
Mean income men .03 0.004 (0.02) .84 -.17 
Mean years education .21 0.01 (0.004) .08 .03 
Adequate sanitation -.18 0.00 (0.00) .28 -.21* 
Rural Areas* .37 0.001 (0.001) .044 .26** 
Black (%) -.07 -0.04 (0.07) .53 -.05 
Multiethnic (%) -.05 -0.01 (0.03) .70 .01 
Asian (%) .04 -0.01   (0.03) .75 -.05 
Indigenous (%) -.10 -0.03 (0.04) .49 .08 
Perception of safety  -.002 0.00 (0.02) .99 -.10 
Perception of violence -.13 -0.02 (0.02) .29 -.15 
Trust in neighbors -.03 -0.004 (0.02) .83 -.02 
Trust in authorities .10 0.01 (0.02) .42 -.01 
Sex ratio -.23 -0.002 (0.001) .12 .03 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Note. R2 = .18. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 







Regression model, predicting wish to own Guns (= DV) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________
Predictors 
Municipality honor score*** .46 0.003(0.001) <.001 .35*** 
Mean income men -.07 -0.02 (0.05) .60 -.08 
Mean years education -.08 0.01(0.01) .52 -.11 
Adequate sanitation .02 0.000(0.001) .89 -.11 
Rural Areas .09 0.001(0.002) .66 .08 
Black (%) .13 0.20(0.20) .32 .06 
Multiethnic (%) .20 0.11 (0.08) .19 .01 
Asian (%) .12 0.06 (0.08) .37 .04 
Indigenous (%) -.07 -0.07 (0.14) .62 -.01 
Perception of safety .20 0.07(0.05) .21 .20* 
Perception of violence .18 0.07 (0.05) .17 .19 
Trust in neighbors -.03 -0.01 (0.05) .83 -.22* 
Trust in authorities .13 0.04 (0.04) .31 .08 
Sex ratio -.05 -0.001(0.004) .76 .04 
Firearm homicide rate* -.43 -0.003(0.001) .011 .07 
Violent death rate* .37 0.001(0.000) .011 .21* 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Note. R2 = .31. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 








Regression model, predicting sexual violence 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
DV: Sexual violence (per 100,000) β b (se) p Pearson r 
______________________________________________________________________________
Predictors 
Municipality honor score .05 0.67 (0.13) .62 .03 
Municipality sexism score .12 4.10 (3.62) .26 .06 
Mean income men .10 5.33 (6.77) .43 .24* 
Mean years education .10 1.24 (1.39) .38 .26** 
Adequate sanitation -.11 -0.09 (0.12) .49 .12 
Rural Areas -.30 -0.42 (0.23) .07 -.35*** 
Black (%) -.05 -11.80 (27.64) .67 .03 
Multiethnic (%) .16 13.95 (11.36) .22 .20 
Asian (%) -.11 -9.41 (10.25) .36 -.11 
Indigenous (%) .02 2.53 (15.16) .87 -.24* 
Sex ratio -.14 -0.57 (0.56) .31 -.26** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Note. R2 = .23. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for 
Sex ratio mean more women than men 
 
 
 
